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Archive for 'Methodology'

Free Floating Discourse
Posted by N Pepperell, 3:30pm 03/03/2008
Methodology, Teaching

Off the wall question: I keep encountering a particular formulation in the work of quite good students who are trying to outline their methodology for research projects. It’s not unusual for someone to say something like: “My method is discourse analysis”.

Now, I react to this statement, sort of the way I would react to someone saying: “My method is statistics”. It gives me a rough ballpark sense of what sort of thing the student wants to do, but is nowhere near specific enough (to me) to indicate what the student actually plans to do (and the formulation itself also strikes me as awkward, as if it doesn’t quite express the habitus for how the term would be used in academic writing).

My question is: I see this so often, that students must somewhere be being taught that this is okay - that “discourse analysis” is a specific enough term that further clarification or specification of their method is not required. I’m curious whether I’m running into a strange displinary issue - whether this term actually does have a quite narrow and specific meaning, such that it would be intuitively clear to anyone who doesn’t scuttle around across disciplinary boundaries as often as I do? I always end up writing things like: “But what kind of discourse analysis? What do you plan to do?” - and the sheer repetition is starting to feel crotchety and pedantic, as if I’m asking students to explain the obvious. Am I?

Scratchpad: From Something, Nothing Comes

Okay. Below the fold is the preliminary draft of the chapterised version of my post from the other day on indeterminacy as a form of determination (doesn’t that line make you wanna peek beneath the fold?). The last third of this chapter is still very undeveloped - basically, if you’re reading, once you get to the point where I start talking about the relationship of all of this to Hegel’s essence/appearance argument, the text from that point gets really sketchy and dubious. If it helps, I’m aware of this, but wanted to write at least a set of placeholder notes for things I want to discuss, when I’m able to revise that section properly. I may not be able to get back to this draft for some days, however, and so I thought I might as well toss it up in its current form. The main line of argument - which relates to how you can provide a socially-immanent explanation for certain categories that appear transhistorical in Marx’s work - is (I hope!!) sufficiently clearly developed for the moment. The points that remain undeveloped will always - in this chapter - be sort of foreshadows of material I can’t discuss in great detail until I’ve set up a few more layers of this argument.

Those who read the version of the previous chapter posted to the blog may notice that the transition at the end of the previous chapter draft doesn’t “work”. That’s because, partially in response to feedback received here, I significantly expanded the previous chapter - to the point that it got a little bit cancerous, and so I split it into two chapters, dividing off the programmatic bits, from the discussion of Marx’s relationship to Hegel, and adding more material to both of those discussions. So I suppose I can now say I’m working on the draft of the third chapter of my thesis. :-)

Usual caveats apply to the content below the fold - with the additional caveat that, for some reason, I’ve found sleep almost impossible for the past several days, and so I’m really not in the position where I can “hear” this text. I think it’s still okay, but it may be much rougher than I realise. :-) Here goes…

Scratchpad: The Greatest Difficulty (No Kidding…)

all work and no play makes jack a dull boyOkay. Below the fold, one substantially - substantially - revised version of my previous attempt to develop a sort of programmatic chapter, outlining the broad brush-strokes of how I’m attempting to approach Capital in the thesis. This version sucks much less than the previous version - it’s decent enough that I would even post it to the main page, except that it’s simply too long (@12,000 words, for those tempted to peer below the fold). This time around, I managed not to forget my main argument while writing the piece. Hopefully this version comes a little closer to addressing some of the fantastic questions Alexei raised in relation to the previous iteration - it’s impossible for me to express how valuable such thoughtful, sympathetic critiques are in the formation of this project, particularly when, as Alexei did, someone takes the time to offer such criticisms with reference to an incredibly crude and… er… speaking frankly, deeply problematic version of the argument I was trying to make.

There are elements with which I’m still fairly uncomfortable. I’ve used, for example, a language of “embodied cognition” in some programmatic bits of the text. While this is a useful shorthand for some of what I’m trying to say about Marx’s argument, it’s also not completely accurate - at least, I don’t think it is… But for the moment, it’s somehow sneaked its way into the text, perhaps to be replaced by something more adequate later on.

There are also elements that are still, essentially, placeholders - the discussion of Phenomenology of Spirit, for example, may well be replaced by a discussion of the treatment of essence and appearance from the Logic - but I haven’t decided yet, and I’m ready to write on these issues in relation to Phenomenology, whereas I’m not quite ready to do this in relation to the Logic, so I’ve written the version that I can include now, in order to give readers at least some sense of what I want to argue in that portion of the chapter.

There is a lot of stylistic chaos in the piece - particularly in the final half, which I still find myself substantially revising each time I look at the text. A few parts have survived relatively unscathed since the previous version: the first two pages are similar, as is the summary of Hegel’s “With What Must the Science Begin?” Everything else is completely new, and therefore as raw, in its own way, as the draft I tossed onto the blog last time. I think this version has a clearer sense of what it’s trying to do, and I hope the internal structure is adequate to render the connections between the various sections clear, and that the piece provides sufficient background along the way that readers aren’t having to struggle to figure out what I am trying to argue. We’ll see…

The text loses something from having the footnotes excised: I write a lot of footnotes, often make substantive points in them, and engage with other literature primarily in this apparatus. It’s unfortunately clumsy to reproduce such things on the blog. As with the previous version, there are heavy debts here to Patrick Murray (for his work on Capital as a Hegelian “science”), Derek Sayer (for his work on Marx’s methodological eclecticism), and Moishe Postone (for his work on Capital as an immanent critical theory), as well as passing references to many others. I’m happy to clarify these sorts of debts in the comments, if anyone is curious.

I owe a very different sort of debt to certain people who have been putting up with my various thesis-related freakouts off the main page :-) Everyone who walks within range at the moment gets an earful of speculation about how Marx understands the relationship between essence and appearance. I suspect somehow that most folks don’t find this topic quite as enthralling as I seem to at the moment. I’m therefore particularly grateful to the ones who haven’t yet started running the other direction whenever they see an email from me :-) Such support is more deeply appreciated than you can know. You’re welcome to “out” yourselves here if you’d like, but otherwise I’ll keep under wraps that you get sneak peeks of ideas that are too ill-formed even to toss up on the blog. ;-P

Below the fold for the piece itself… Although I am still revising this piece, and working on the following chapter, there is a real sense in which working out what I’ve posted below really has been the “greatest difficulty” for me. I’m going to take a break from the blog and from all forms of writing for the rest of the day, but I will hopefully find time tomorrow at least to update the list of posting related to the Science of Logic reading group, which has seen a burst of inspired reflections over at Now-Times during the period when I’ve exiled myself from blogging to get this other writing done.

Scratchpad: How Must the Science Begin? (Not This Way, Surely…)

*sigh* This is awful. But I’m tired of looking at it, I need to move on now and write other things, and dumping it on the blog seems the best way to draw a bright, embarrassing line under it, and force myself to move on. Some version of this piece in the near future will be much better. It has to be. But that’s not going to happen this week. So below the fold this goes - a sort of framing mini-chapter, intended to do roughly the same work that the “Fragment on the Textual Strategy of Capital post did for the blog series on Capital, now that I’m finally ready (as I had mentioned wanting to do in the blog series) to outline this argument a bit more adequately, with reference to the work I’ve been doing on Hegel’s Science of Logic. My problem with this piece isn’t so much how it reworks these specific arguments - it’s more with everything else that somehow sneaked in along the way, with how many unintegrated layers this text seems to have acquired in its very brief life, and with the many sections where I know - please trust me, I know - I need to develop further what I have said, but where every time I add something, it just seems to make everything that much worse…

So below the fold it goes. Good riddance, for the moment at least…

Life on Mars

“…there is no reason to suppose that an inhabitant of Mars would see us more ‘objectively’ than we, for instance, see ourselves.” ~ Karl Popper

Popper, K. (1976 [1962]), “The Logic of the Social Sciences”, The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology, p. 92.

Explaining Research Proposals

I’ll try to write something substantive again later in the week - at the moment, I’m absolutely drowning in marking, which leaves me no time to have interesting thoughts, let alone pull them together into something others might want to read… For my own reference as much as anything else, I’ve tucked below the fold a sort of “Research Proposals for Dummies” piece I wrote this week for my quant methods students. It’s very, very, very simplistic - among other things, because it’s written for second-year undergrads, many of whom have no intention of going on to research careers - but some of my Research Strategies students also found the material helpful as a very basic breakdown and explanation of the strategic intent of the sections of a proposal. The piece might be useful for someone needing similar material for their own students, and not wanting to start utterly from scratch, but wanting to riff off of someone else’s basic structure.

Note that, because this piece was written in relation to a specific assessment, much of the material is obviously not relevant to a standard proposal (and I’m too lazy and too busy - hmm… can one be both? Evidently so… - to rewrite this as a more general piece right now). Note also that I wrote this at 3 a.m. - caveat emptor.

If anyone does convert this into something less assessment-specific - or improve it in all the various other ways it needs to improved - I’d consider it a great kindness if you’d share a copy of your revised version with me.

Ontology Interests [Updated x2]

For those who have been curious about L Magee’s project, particularly if you’ve had a look and are still wondering what it is all about, I note that an introduction has been now posted over at schematique. Armed with the new information this introduction provides, I logged in to have a play, and am currently contemplating what to enter into my profile. Like the (sorely missed) “destroy” button, the profile screen offers all kinds of outlets for my anarchic impulses. There is a very large free response space, for example, where I can list my “ontology interests”. I’m wondering whether the appropriate answer for someone like me should be (with a nod to rob) “that there be none” or “prefer epistemology, myself”…

I also love the help information on this page: it’s not every day you see help for a profile that explains:

Only the username and password fields are obligatory. Other fields are used to add metadata to your ontology

But what if my ontology interest is “avoiding metadata”? What if I like my ontologies neat?

Also, although this seems somehow oddly appropriate, given my interest in self-reflexivity, should I have been able to do this:

Huis Clos

orange. continues to hold this blog’s methodology slam title, offering a new interpretation of what’s really going on, for all who have been confused by L Magee’s ontology-matching experiment: orange. suggests that it’s later than we think. What LM has been calling a “pre-alpha” software development phase is no such thing: in reality, the software is fully developed, and the experiment’s on us!!! The cat’s out of the bag now, LM: admit it - you’re just studying what academics do when you throw them out of their comfort zone, and place them in a state of confusion: do we bluff, nod sagely, and pretend that we know what’s going on? Do we lash out and start tossing citations? How confusing does the environment actually have to be, before we fess up and admit we have no idea what’s going on?

Beta Blocker
Posted by N Pepperell, 5:58pm 26/03/2007
Links, Methodology, Reading Group

I know that L Magee has been working very hard recently on the development and debugging of the ontology matching software that will provide the empirical data for a dissertation on the Semantic Web. Being the kind, considerate friend that I am, and wanting to ensure that LM stays always in a state of good cheer through this intensive work period, I must draw LM’s (and everyone else’s) attention to how the beta is already garnering scholarly repute. From orange.’s interference: yes, LM, you have now been immortalised as:

LMagee, contributor to Rough Theory and author of the strangest beta I ve ever seen

The Theory Chapter Reloaded
Posted by N Pepperell, 3:42pm 24/02/2007
Methodology, Teaching

I know this is becoming a bit of a regular rant… but I was thinking again this afternoon about how common it is for methods courses and textbooks to start with some kind of introductory “theory chapter”, which generally informs students that, before they begin any kind of research design process, they must:

(1) know their epistemological and ontological stance; and

(2) be able to position themselves in relation to a wide range of theoretical debates.

This is so common that I’m beginning to get a bit worried about how counter-intuitive I find it to be. I mean, I love discussions of epistemology and ontology - probably a bit too much ;-P - and I’m quite happy to position myself away in theoretical debates of all sorts. But I think it’s fairly safe to say that I would never start a research design course or text with these issues. I think it’s also safe to say that these are not issues that arose - in this form, at least - early in my own engagement with either research or philosophy. Am I that much of an outlier?

Amusingly enough, my main objection to this approach is itself ontological: there’s something about formulating the issue in this way - as though the researcher is some kind of disembodied consciousness, floating around in The Matrix, saying, “I need Theory - lots of Theory!” - and then out roll the shelves of high-powered concepts from the aether, from which the disembodied consciousness then selects whatever approach makes it feel most secure. What about the relationship of the theory to the object of analysis? What about the relationship of all of this to some underlying question? How do students make sense of and understand their theoretical choices, when this is how theory is presented to them?

Then there’s the pedagogical issue: maybe I overcompensate, but I tend to assume that most students - most peers, for that matter - won’t be as interested in abstract theoretical discussions as I am… Unless forced to start with these issues because the students are confronting them in assigned texts, I tend to sidle my way up to terms like “epistemology” and “ontology”, because I think it takes a bit of intellectual grounding for students to be able to understand why someone would care about what appear, on their face, to be rather abstract concerns. My experience has been that students find the concepts terrifyingly fuzzy - and that their fear isn’t assuaged by the tendency of “theory chapters” in methodology texts to rush past a definition of these concepts, and into long lists of competing ontological and epistemological stances one could conceivably adopt - all lined up in a row, in neat boxes - sometimes with light bulbs flashing beside them - as though people make a common practice of dealing with significant ontological and epistemological questions by trundling their conceptual carts down the theoretical aisles in some vast grocery store of human knowledge…

I know I’ve said this before - recently enough that I shouldn’t still be ranting about this topic - but my impulse is to start with something much more grounded - much more solidly within students’ experiential frame: with what students are curious about, where their passions lie. From here, they can begin to ask questions - and those questions will then, eventually, give them the basis for finding ontological and epistemological questions meaningful - and for translating their interests into something that might fall within the boundaries of academic research.

I realise that textbooks don’t have the flexibility I have in the classroom, to build a discussion around students’ questions and dreams… But still… Wouldn’t it be possible, at least in principle, for a text to talk about curiosity as the origin point for a research process? To sketch some examples (which surely wouldn’t be any more misleading that the text box versions of theoretical positions these texts already supply) of how particular researchers found their way to problems, which then teased and thwarted them into methodological strategies - and then to unpack the concepts of epistemology and ontology from there?