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Archive for 'Professional Life'

An Inconvenient Talk
Posted by N Pepperell, 4:46pm 02/05/2008
Professional Life, Teaching

*sigh* A few days ago, I was dragged from my coffee shop by an urgent phone call, begging me to stand in at the last minute for a lecture that needs to be given next week to an advanced undergraduate course in social and political theory, aimed at students currently preparing their honours thesis. The request was presented in terms of the need to have someone discuss the sociology of scientific knowledge - to provide a sort of massive-brush-stroke narrative of Enlightenment degenerating into postwar technocratic myth, the anti-technocratic backlash in critical theory, and then contemporary rapprochements between social theory and science. Although I wince every time I do this sort of “bottled modernity” lecture, I have actually delivered lectures with this particular narrative line in the past, and so the request seemed “do-able” around my extremely packed schedule.

Now, though, I’ve received the course materials and seen how the lecture has been advertised to students, what readings they have been assigned, what their tutorial activities will be. And it turns out that I should have paid more attention to a sort of muttered mention of “you know, global warming sorts of things” when my interlocutor mentioned that the lecture should also include a discussion of rapprochements between social theory and science. As it turns out, as far as the course materials and therefore the students are concerned, this is a lecture on global warming. The students will be watching An Inconvenient Truth after I shut up and send them off to their tutorials. The “point” of the lecture, as far as I can tell, is to talk about the social theory of global warming denialism.

Now, as much as I love lurking the wonderful Real Climate site, I have no particular competence to lecture on the topic of global warming. I have not researched social theoretic interpretations of climate change scepticism. I have no idea what to say. I’ve done some work on parallel forms of imagery in conceptualising the economy and the natural environment over time, but that hardly seems on target for a lecture of this sort. I can talk (possibly endlessly) about capitalism and the compulsive transformation of material nature - on production become a runaway end in itself… But these shreds of competence seem to flutter past the “point” of this lecture…

If you were called on at the last minute to give a lecture on this topic, what sorts of things would you want to say? Any ideas? Anyone? What I’m trying to do is get my head around how to link what I already know, with a narrative structure that might be useful for a lecture of this sort… So any suggestions around which my ideas can begin to crystallise, would be most welcome…

Conversations on Textual Strategy

I am absolutely buried at the moment, but I thought I would belatedly post a pointer to an energetic discussion still unfolding over at Larval Subjects on the question of the necessity of “difficult writing” in certain kinds of philosophical texts. From the original post:

Hopefully I have enough “cred” to inveigh against “difficult books” (I am, after all, mired in the work of figures such as Deleuze, Lacan, Hegel, etc., who are the worst of the worst), but I have increasingly found myself suspicious of the “difficult work”. On the one hand, I read texts in the sciences that express extremely complex ideas in very basic prose. Somehow I’m just unwilling to concede that what Hegel is trying to talk about is any more difficult or complex than what the biologist, complexity theory, economic social theorist, ecologist, or quantum physicist is attempting to articulate. This leads to my concern. I wonder if terribly dense styles such as we find in figures like Deleuze, Lacan, Hegel, Derrida, etc., etc., etc., aren’t a form of intellectual terrorism. Please do not misunderstand me. I am not referring to the quality of their concepts or arguments. What I am referring to is a general writing strategy that demands so much work on the part of the reader in the art of interpretation, that by the time you’ve managed to make heads or tails of what Lacan is arguing or Hegel is seeking to articulate or Deleuze is seeking to theorize, you have so much invested that you simply cannot think critically about that figure.

The rest of the post, and then the extensive discussion that follows, open interesting questions around the ways in which particular kinds of writing cultivate, or fail to cultivate, particular reading experiences and affective attachments to authors. Adam has also weighed in at An und für sich with a gloss on the original post:

I have some reservations about the recent Larval Subjects post about “difficult” books, but I think that, in part, it points toward a real phenomenon — one that I call “academic Stockholm Syndrome.” We’ve all seen it before: an academic invests great energy and undergoes profound suffering in the attempt to grasp a particularly difficult thinker and, upon succeeding, spends the rest of his or her career thoroughly identified with that thinker.

“Academic Stockholm Syndrome” sounds like it might not be a bad phrase to pick out a structural risk of a number of dimensions of academic training…

I’ve posted briefly in the discussion at Larval Subjects, before other commitments overwhelmed my blogging time. I wanted at least to put up a pointer for those who haven’t already seen the discussion…

Examination
Posted by N Pepperell, 10:38am 18/04/2008
Professional Life, Research, Supervision, Writing

So… This strikes me as something I probably shouldn’t write on a blog… And as something that, if people do respond, they might prefer backchannels… But here goes anyway…

In the Australian system, doctoral dissertations are sent for external examination. The impression I’m getting from supervisors and other academic advisors, is that there is a level of general anxiety over who should examine my work… I don’t find this reassuring… Particularly as I have a not-so-general anxiety over this issue myself… I have the impression, without going into great specifics, that this is regarded as more of a problem for my thesis than it normally would be - make of this what you will…

So… making this a question: for those working in similar systems, where external examiners needed to be chosen - any helpful advice about how you winnowed down an appropriate examiner pool? Any immediate associations to people you think should examine my work? Any advice that I should take this post down promptly, and never write publicly on this issue again? ;-P

As a side note: one of the funnier things about the anxiety over who will examine my thesis is panic every time I mention thinking of corresponding with anyone in anything resembling my field - or with having a coffee with like-minded senior academics at conferences - or similar. This can’t be right, can it? I understand the general principle that someone can’t examine a work if they’ve been materially involved in advising that work, but I am receiving advice that is actually impeding me in substantive ways, from following up with established scholars whose ideas I find interesting and useful, and whose opinions I would value. There’s an academic just down the road from me, someone I run into several times a year at local functions - we have friendly, impersonal but animated, exchanges, and I have a particular issue I would like to follow up on with him, and I am under strict orders to stay away from him and under no circumstances to allow him to see any of my written work, as he might be a potential examiner… When I mentioned to a supervisor that I would be presenting a talk based on a chapter at an upcoming event, I was given strict orders not to distribute written copies of the talk, on the grounds that this might contaminate an examiner pool. I was a bit shocked at this, and pointed out that I almost always make copies of talks available on the blog - I was then told that this doesn’t “count”, but physically passing around copies would: this begins to sound a bit like academic superstition…

At any rate, just feeling frustrated, anxious, and slightly confused… ;-)

Metonymy
Posted by N Pepperell, 11:08pm 15/03/2008
Blogging, Professional Life

Georges de la Tour MagdaleneThe sorts of conversations that have been possible on this blog, and on the other places I’ve stumbled across since starting this site, have been more important to me than I can easily express. Online interactions can be difficult to navigate - misinterpretations are easier, conflicts can escalate more quickly, discussions can spiral in more negative directions, than similar face-to-face interactions. I’ve been active in online discussions of various sorts since back in bulletin board days, and so I have a fair sense of what can go wrong.

When I realised people were actually reading this blog, that conversations would be possible about my work here and at other sites, I wanted to see whether it were possible to incubate different sorts of interactions than I had had in the past - interactions where contention and debate could take place without the sometimes ugly spirals that can characterise online discussions. And I also wanted to escape some of the constraints of face-to-face discussions, to feel free to extend myself intellectually in ways that often aren’t possible in traditional institutional settings, to make an advantage out of some of the depersonalising elements of online discussion, in order to have conversations that can explore ideas in a way that separates those ideas more from the person who puts them forward, than is generally possible in face-to-face interaction. None of this is some sort of ideal of communication - I don’t think communication “ought” to be so abstracted from the personal - but it was the specific form of communication I was seeking out here, as a form of interaction less available - for me - in face-to-face settings.

I’ve discussed in earlier posts the reasons that, initially, I posted pseudonymously here and why, even when I decided to “out” my identity, I still didn’t use my first name, even though it was easy at that point for anyone to look it up: previous experience in online discussions had shown very clearly how quickly things could go in very ugly gendered directions - I wanted at least the buffer provided by gender not being immediately evident to drive-by visitors to the blog. To the extent this is ever possible, I hoped people might deal with my ideas, and not with “me”, unless we were having a discussion where something about my personal background was relevant. Again, I’m not stating an ideal here - not suggesting that this is what discussions “ought” to be, or that it’s inherently better to differentiate ideas from their bearers, or anything like that. I’m just describing what I see as a very personal motive for seeking out a very specific kind of interaction that is difficult to find elsewhere, where for a period I can worry much less about gendered interpersonal dynamics than I often can in everyday life.

Gender issues aside, I also made a decision, which perhaps I follow through on better at some points than others, to try not to take offence at the things people say or the way positions are articulated - to try to find the best point I can see, in whatever position I’m addressing, and respond to that. This doesn’t prevent miscommunication. Sometimes the best point I can see, still isn’t what the other person meant - sometimes other people are offended by what I intend to be a positive restatement of what I take them to be saying - things still go wrong. Generally, though, on balance, and with most people who have landed here, I hope I’ve been largely successful at communicating that I’m interested in taking other people seriously, in de-escalating and redirecting conversations that seem in danger of getting a bit heated, in having largely productive discussions, where it becomes possible - for me at least - to learn something from them. It’s what I’m looking for from blogging, and largely it’s what I’ve managed to find here.

Sometimes it fails spectacularly. One recent interaction - I won’t link to it, but have screenshotted it, blanking out the other person’s photo and identifying details. I stumbled across a blog referring to an event in which I participated recently. The post plugged the event, and then quoted some text from my blog, made fun of the complexity of my writing, and then asked a question about what I was trying to say. Part of what I mean, when I talk about trying to respond to the best point I can find in something, is that in general I seriously don’t take criticisms personally, even when they are voiced disrespectfully - and, if I’m going to respond, I address my comments to the substantive points raised, and generally aim for discussion, rather than for self-defence. So I responded; and the reply then consisted of this blogger’s description of the kind of sex he fantasised having with me (if folks care about this sort of thing in deciding whether to click through, it’s not a subtle comment).

My main reaction to this is a feeling of tired familiarity at how often exactly this sort of thing used to happen when I posted in discussions where my gender was more evident than it is here. There are some other complicating factors, which I won’t go into here, which make this incident less removed from my real world life than I would like. I don’t know what sort of discussion I’m looking to open, by posting about this… Incidents like this are depressing, in what they show about the ready-to-handness of this kind of behaviour. But I think what is striking me about this incident, is the way it reinforces something I’ve been feeling about publishing (as, of course, we all need to do) in settings other than the blog. Although this guy quoted some material from the blog, he knows my name - and therefore gender - from the conference program, where, along with all the other presenters, I spelled the name out in full. Every time I have provided details for a conference program or other material I knew would end up online, I’ve felt very conflicted over doing this, because it means that my full name now circulates, immediately gendering my work - taking away the possibility of the less pronouncedly gendered interactions that I’ve been able to cultivate online. I think I’ve been telling myself, as I hand over what should be this least personal of personal details, that I am being ridiculous - that I’m experiencing something as a loss, when nothing is really taken away. I think this incident stands out for me as an indication that I wasn’t entirely wrong - that something has been lost, and that a further level of anonymity - at least to casual readers - has been taken away.

The thing is, the way I’ve carved out a space here is, I know, a very apolitical response to a political problem - I’ve opened a level of freedom for myself by creating a small space of personal ambiguity, which has meant that it’s generally only the folks who stick around, who have some curiosity and interest in what I’m writing, who know much about me personally. This strategy doesn’t hit at the fundamentally political issue of how knowledge of the personal is wielded. So there’s a sense in which this sort of temporary shelter I’ve erected here has perhaps never been appropriate. But it has been more important to me than I can adequately explain to be able, for a time, in one part of my life, not to need to worry about such things…

We’ll see if I keep this post up :-) I’m not sure yet whether I’ll think better of it and take it down…

Europe in May/June - Suggestions?
Posted by N Pepperell, 12:32am 29/02/2008
Events, Procrastination, Professional Life

I’ll be presenting to a conference in Rome in late May, and am hoping to be able to stay in Europe for at least a few weeks after. I hadn’t initially been certain this trip would happen - otherwise, I would have liked to put in proposals for other events. I’ll be at a point where it would be helpful to have opportunities to workshop thesis-related materials. Unfortunately, it’s a bit late to put in proposals to present to other events of which I’m aware. I’m not planning to spend the entire visit in Italy, but am trying to decide where else I might wander. That decision might boil down to whether there are interesting critical theory related events to sit in on, while I’m in the vicinity. If anyone knows of events that might be of interest, feel free to pass things on. (And, yes, in fact, critical theory events are actually what I do for leisure, even in Melbourne… ;-P)

Just Because You Can
Posted by N Pepperell, 12:52am 11/02/2008
Professional Life

I wasn’t going to blog this, but I can’t seem to stop trying to “process” it, and I have a lot of work to do tonight, so onto the blog it goes.

Demanding Literature

Joseph Kugelmass has tagged me (cross-post at The Valve) to respond to a meme, explaining: Why do you teach literature?

I feel guilty about being tagged for this meme for several reasons. First, thinking of responding causes me to look back over my shoulder guiltily at Claude, whose own tag still somehow eludes me.

Second… perhaps a delicate matter… I… er… don’t teach literature - at least in the sense implied by the posts I’ve read thus far in the discussion, and by Joe’s tag itself, which mentions hoping to hear reflections about the value of teaching in the humanities… I am instead a lurker and reader of the blogs of those who teach literature and the humanities, parasitic on this community for intellectual stimulation, while I myself study and teach… sundry fields - often of the sort that would fall on the “social science” side of the line. As my lurking and, perhaps, writing habits indicate, I don’t place much stock in the social science/humanities divide, and don’t affiliate myself in a strong sense with any particular discipline. I’m nevertheless conscious that, unlike the other respondents to this meme, I have never formally taught a humanities course (what happens informally… well, that’s another matter…).

Third, this meme has attracted some truly fantastic responses already, originating in the reflections posted at Reassigned Time, being born as a meme at Free Exchange on Campus, and then viralling its memetic tendrils through Citizen of Somewhere Else, A White Bear, and other sites, no doubt due to increase greatly in number in the near future. Very good discussions have broken out around these posts, and both the original posts and the comments are well worth a read. [Updated to add: Free Exchange on Campus is now maintaining a running archive of contributions.]

Fragonard The ReaderThese earlier posts, and those spiralling out from them, open onto a number of interesting questions about how we engage students with complex materials. Dr. Crazy from Reassigned Time opens the discussion with a reaction against an MLA panel whose justifications for teaching literature appeared too closely bound to the student populations and teaching loads of elite universities:

Those who make claims about why we teach literature often teach very little and teach to a very specific sort of student population; those who talk about trends in the discipline often have very little connection to the vast majority of practitioners within the discipline.

And then suggests the following reasons for teaching literature to a much more diverse range of students, in conditions in which much teaching follows a “consumer model of education”:

- to inspire curiosity;
- to disrupt the consumer model of education;
- to insist on complexity and fine distinctions for understanding the world;
- to give students a vocabulary for discussing things that are complex, which is ultimately about socializing them to talk, think, and feel in ways that allow them to be upwardly mobile; and
- to offer students a break from the other demands on their lives.

The Constructivist, from Citizen of Somewhere Else, discovers analogies between the teaching of literature and the coaching of golf, focussing on cultivating readers who are more attentive to themselves and to texts. The coaching metaphors allow The Constructivist to talk about the important limits of pedagogy:

I’m not trying to indoctrinate my students into what I consider to be the one best way of swinging a club, playing a hole, and thinking your way around a course. Sure, I’ll demonstrate a few shots, show them clips of how various golfers have played a given hole, and give them advice on playing a particular course. But I can’t play the game for them. What I can do is to try to give all my students the tools and the opportunities to practice making their own decisions on how, when, and why to play the game. Because I know from experience that each round of golf is different, even when played on the same course by the same person, I take for granted that every person is going to have their own experience on each reading of a literary text. That doesn’t mean they designed the course; it just means they’re following a fairly unique path around it. And it’s worth their time and effort to keep track of their path, compare it to others’, and reflect on the similarities and differences, not just to modify their techniques and strategies for the next round, but to get a better sense of the range of experiences and emotions golf offers, as well.

This limit, reflected upon, becomes a realm of possibility, a means for students to become aware of the intrinsically social character of our encounter with literature:

Reading is not just the personal and individual and private process of experiencing a text, it is also the social and collective and public process of sharing one’s experiences with others.

A White Bear comments on the need to break through her students’ orientation to texts as commodities, noting students’ tendencies to analyse texts as though reflecting on their potential mass audience commercial appeal, at the expense even of registering their own personal likes and dislikes:

To teach students to approach literature (and language and culture in general) as analysts, with a sense of history, and tools, and expertise, is to give them the power to think as individuals in the face of a large and difficult set of problems. It offers them a way out of obsessing about consensus and marketability. It leads them past the narcissism of personal taste. It makes them ask why things are the way they are and how they got that way. Who benefits? Who suffers? To read and think clearly is to see authors, characters, and even other possible readers not as an undifferentiated mass with spending power or cultural capital, but as individuals, with specific, often conflicting, desires and needs. Reading literature analytically is about making necessary distinctions and prudent, fruitful comparisons, maintaining difference where there is difference, and spotting a false note or an obfuscation for what it fails to represent.

Her post also offers the one-sentence version of this argument:

I teach literature in a desperate plea to my students not to be suckers.

Joseph Kugelmass offers some critical reflections on Dr. Crazy’s original post, pointing to a potential tension within the list above, between moments that attempt to disrupt the consumer model of education, and moments that would seem in some ways to reinforce the core assumptions of that model. Joe searches for a means to cultivate, through literature, a “social and empathic curiosity” through a pedagogical practice that aims explicitly to be impractical in both an economic and (narrowly understood) political sense, aimed squarely at any form of instrumentalisation of the teaching of literature. Joe seeks to open doors: his students must walk through them on their own. At the same time, he playfully appropriates A White Bear’s concept of “the sucker” to suggest the sort of disjoint he wants to achieve through this technique - knocking his students just slightly out of kilter with the straight plane of an instrumentally-oriented world:

A White Bear writes, very wittily, that she teaches in order to plead with her students not to be suckers. I do love the salty, healthy skepticism that aesthetic training provides. Nonetheless, I have to admit that most often books make readers look like suckers. They bore their friends with the details of character and plot. They buy tributary, explanatory books with annotations or critical essays. They name various things after books or parts of books, including cats, computers, and their personas on the Internet. Whenever a reader is acting most naturally, minus the solemnizing accessories of a leather chair and a study, she looks like a dreamer, a fool, or both. Yes, that’s what I teach. It’s not always dignified, but it’s irreplaceable.

These are wonderful reflections, and I’m unsure that I would find much to add, even if I were not a student of sundry fields, who spends much of my time teaching social science methodology and economics - with the occasional foray into planning theory as the closest approach to humanities subjects (and here under heavy duress to suppress the connections I do make to the humanities). Yet the concerns raised in the posts above do resonate for me - and not simply abstractly, but as matters of direct pedagogical urgency.

chimeraOne of the things I find myself thinking about often is a strange tension in at least the local variant of the consumer model of education. Courses should be “practical” - shouldn’t stray too far or fast from what is necessary to equip students for the professional demands of their careers. This position is justified with reference to the claim that the students are the consumers, and their demand drives toward greater and greater practicality and professional relevance for their coursework. This rationale, however, is a chimera. When students - undergraduate students - come to us, they do not know what their professions will demand of them, what it means for coursework to be “practical” in a professionally-relevant sense. They also don’t know what professions exist - or what sorts of work might be possible within the professions they have heard something about - and thus what sorts of “practices” might be relevant, somewhere, somewhen, in some professional space. They also don’t know what university is - what university “ought” to be. And they don’t know what they are - or what they might become, as possibilities are opened for them through their encounters with one another, with teachers, with texts, at university.

They learn the answers - or, perhaps more accurately, the boundaries or limits on the acceptable types of answers - largely from us. From their encounters with marketing materials, recruitment staff, orientation, the courses we require - and the courses we allow them to choose. We create our own consumers - whose constructed demands we then somehow manage to position as forces that exist outside of us, forms of domination to which we must comply. Of course, we don’t create our own consumers in a vacuum - given my own work, I can’t help but be aware of the pressures on students and universities alike to instrumentalise education in the service of employability, accountability, direct applicability in some professional sphere. When we start inflecting these complex structural pressures, however, in terms of some rhetoric of “consumer choice” - as though we are reacting to a “given” presented by the autonomous decisions of our students - we greatly diminish our appreciation for our own institutional agency in constituting, and in failing to engage critically with, certain forms of “demand”.

My classes, generally, are hard. They involve a great deal of reading and writing. The texts are not easy. The concepts are difficult. The students are often initially extremely sceptical, having been socialised (not least by their university experiences) to be distrustful of anything too “academic”. This reaction, though, isn’t fixed and frozen, as suggested by the model of “consumer driven” education. The course itself transforms the nature of student expectations and demands - not for all students, of course, but for a significant number. How much more might this be possible - and how many new and interesting “demands” might our “consumers” place upon us - if more opportunities for such exploration were built in to the curriculum? I’m not sure if this exactly answers the question posed, but these concerns certainly do shape how I teach - which is with an eye to opening possibilities that students could not otherwise encounter, outside the confrontation with difficult material, taught in a way that attempts to demystify this difficulty, and in the process show students something about themselves and their world that they could not have dreamt without at least a bit of… philosophy…

Okay. I think I’m supposed to tag people now… ;-P Not sure whom to tap. Nate, Wildly, the folks at Perverse Egalitarianism (do you count as more than one? or do you get out of this entirely, since you write so often and so well on pedagogical issues?), ZaPaper, and - can I tap someone who doesn’t have a blog? - would perhaps rob be willing to comment on this?

[Note: images from Wikipedia, with original sources linked above.]

Subjective Implication, Valorisation, and Ambivalence

I unfortunately don’t have time to comment adequately, but I just wanted to point to this extraordinary post by Nate over at what in the hell…, reflecting on the political potentials of the concept of an autonomous university. Nate may not regard this as a “theoretical” piece - I’m not sure - but, from my point of view and in terms of what I might hope theoretical work might achieve, this is one of the best examples I’ve seen of how a solid theoretical grasp of the relationships and interconnections between ideals, institutions, practices and processes at play in a contemporary context, can contribute to political decision-making “on the ground”. It’s difficult to give a sense of the piece in the time I have. Particularly strong, from my point of view, are the questions about the viability of a form of political practice that seeks to divide a labour process from a valorisation process, the critique of the concept of “intellectual labour” and the sorts of historical and sociological generalisations often associated with this category, and the discussion of the politically ambivalent character of ideals that appeal to the unique dignity or social role of particular forms of labour. An excerpt from the conclusion to the piece:

Two final points. First point: I am troubled by the inter-related claims to the centrality of the edu-factory in contemporary capitalism, claims to an epochal shift which has rendered the present incredibly different from the past, and claims that the nature of the valorization process is tremendously different for us - either spatially because the edu-factory is different from other-factories or temporally because the change of era has created a mutation in the mode of valorization. These claims strike me as of questionable truth
and strike me as predicated on mistaking the valorization process for the labor process, (I have used these terms throughout, if anyone isn’t familiar with them, I take them from chapter 7 of volume one of Marx’s Capital). Certainly the substance of our work is quite different from other forms of work, just as other forms of work all differ from each other, but our relationships to our employers and to capital is not really so different. More importantly, these claims strike me as moving in precisely the wrong direction. I have already written in earlier emails that I feel there is a rhetorical slip in our discussions about the edufactory: we speak of ourselves as intellectual laborers - as if other labors lack an intellectual content - and we speak of ourselves inside the edufactory as if we and people who do work like us are the only ones who work in this industry, when in reality neither is true.

By emphasizing the differences between our situation and others, we in the edufactory will diminish our power in two ways. On the one hand, we will lose intellectual resources - examples of struggles that can provide lessons for us from other eras and other sectors of the economy. On the other hand, we will lose the support of our fellow employees in the edufactory and elsewhere. I have already stated my discomfort with the implied claims that the edu-factory project represents the interests of workers in The University, when really the network appears to be made up entirely of people who perform labor as or like academics. That does not mean the project is without value, far from it. But it seems to me that one should always pause for a moment whenever one part of a class claims to speak for the whole class, and it also seems to me that this implicit claim to universality is something very, very much a part of what academic workers are trained to do in the edu-factory. That is, it is an attitude which is part and parcel of the ordinary operations of the edu-factory. This brings me to my second point.

In their piece entitled “Precarious Lexicon,” the Precarias a la Deriva wrote that “in jobs with a repetitive content (telemarketing, cleaning, textile workshops), the subjective implication with the task performed is zero and this leads to forms of conflict of pure refusal: generalized absenteeism, dropout-ism, sabotage (….)On the other hand, in jobs where the content is of the vocational/professional type (from nursing to informatics, to social work to research) and, as such, the subjective implication with the task performed is high, conflict is expressed as critique: of the organization of labor, of the logic that articulates it, of the ends toward which it is structured (….) Finally, in those jobs where the content is directly invisibilized and/or stigmatized (the most paradigmatic examples are cleaning work, home care, and sexual work, especially - but not only - street prostitution), conflict manifests as a demand for dignity and the recognition of the social value of what is done.” (http://www.sindominio.net/karakola/precarias/lexicon.htm) I mention this observation to note again that the edufactory contains more than one sort of work and demands for the autonomous operation of only one sort of work, academic work, will not necessarily speak to or advance the interests of all who do work in the edufactory. I’m not sure that the demand for the autonomous university even represents all academic workers, let alone workers employed in universities or in education.

The reason I compared the autonomous university to an attempt to create a workers’ run cooperative (or perhaps a federation thereof) is that the initiative strikes me as an attempt to disentangle the labor process in existing academic work from the valorization process. That’s an understandable impulse. Compared to most of the other work I’ve done, I enjoy the substance of my job in university. Reading, writing, discussing - those are enjoyable pursuits. I particularly enjoy teaching and find that rewarding. Even more than enjoying these parts of the job, they form a part of my sense of self in relation to others. As the Precarias put it, my “subjective implication with the task performed is high.” This is not unique to the edufactory, of course, and I suspect that some of the impulse to see the edufactory as central to capitalism today may be the result of our subjective implication with our work in the edufactory. (I can imagine lawyers and doctors and media professionals, for instance, objecting to the claims made about the edufactory lying at the heart of capitalism and arguing for the primacy of a jurisprudence-factory, a hospital-factory, a spectacle-factory.)

My subjective implication with my work in the edufactory connects to what I dislike about my job - the ways in which the power structures on the job interfere with those elements. This is not unique to the edufactory, however. As I said earlier, the majority of the problems I have with my job in the edufactory are the problems involved with having to sell my labor power and having to let others use my labor power during the time I have rented it to them - I have concerns with respect, pay, benefits, the amount of time I spend working and the intensity of my work. These things will exist as long as capitalism exists, but are best challenged by organization at the point of production as I’ve already said. That is, I have problems with having to have a job and the qualities of having a job, like almost anyone else who has a job and very much like others with jobs in which the employees are highly subjectively implicated.

More importantly, however, there is a problematic aspect to the impulse to disentangle the labor process from the valorization process in the edufactory, which is that there seems to be an implied valorization (in the non-marxian sense of the term) of academic labor. That is, there is an implication here along the lines of the dignity of labor. This strikes me as in keeping with a certain ideology by which the edu-factory operates, an injunction for the edufactory worker to value their labor (and thus not to resist the valorization of their labor) because their labor is worth doing, because it is good for society. (In some respects this recapitulates the old traditions of labor republicanism and small-producer socialism, as does the project for an autonomous workers’ co-operative university, a sort of return to the early modern era within what some would call postmodernity.) This is again what the Precarias call subjective implication. To my mind, edufactory workers’ subjective implication in our work is at best ambivalent, being a source of division and class weakness as much as of conflict and powerful organization

Of course, as someone who is subjectively implicated in my work, I don’t have an argument to make against the importance of edufactory work. In fact, part of what keeps me going as an academic worker is precisely my sense that the work is important, along with the other things I find satisfying about it. I’m not sure that that sense is exactly accurate, though, and I’m hesitant about uncritically valorizing it precisely because I think it’s linked to maintaining the valorization process in the edufactory. I think the sense of importance of academic work functions as a sort of conscience wage, a nonmonetary payment in use values such as satisfaction and a sense of superiority. (I have in mind two writers who touch briefly on non-monetary wages: Leopoldina Fortunati in her discussion of love as a payment in exchange for domestic work which goes unpaid in monetary terms and David Roediger in the psychological wage that white people in the United States receive for their role in white supremacy. See Fortunati’s The Arcane of Reproduction and Roediger’s The Wages of Whiteness.) I see the sense that academic labor is important (and perhaps unique) as an important part of the impulse to see academic labor as separable from the academic valorization process. This is not an argument against that separation, but a plea for caution and critical engagement with the sensibility. Put simply, the bosses in the edufactory want edufactory workers to think of the edufactory as producing something important. I take it as axiomatic that if we find ourselves doing something at all similar to what the bosses want then we should pause a moment and reflect further.

But go read the whole thing - there is much, much more in the original.

Unintentional (Dis-)honesty
Posted by N Pepperell, 10:33am 10/12/2007
Overheard, Professional Life

It’s possible that this comment will entirely lose its humour when stripped of its context, which unfortunately I cannot provide. But it took me several minutes to get my expression fully under control, in a meeting where someone earnestly explained to me:

I hope you’ll understand what a difficult decision this has been for us - a sign of this difficulty is how we spent some weeks prevaricating about you first.

Indeed.

Hobart Roundup

The conference just finished, with the final day including: some excellent presentations (as in all other days of the conference); an AGM for the Australasian Society for Continental Philosophy, which has existed as an informal organisation for some years, but which is this year incorporating itself as a formal body, which led to some interesting organisational discussions; and a fantastic, provocative closing panel on the future of continental philosophy that, for an interloper like me, was incredibly useful, quite aside from the issues officially being debated, in providing background information on the history and institutional organisation of philosophy in Australian universities.

I found myself sketching a number of notes during the final day in particular, relating to how to explain “what I do” in terms that might be intelligible to other people (of course, this just means that I’ll get back to Melbourne, try to talk to a sociologist, and find that now I’m making no sense to that discipline… ;-P). It’s a funny feature of a conference like this, how much it makes me feel like a sociologist - at the same time as I enjoy and believe that I follow the papers and the discussion, I inevitably find myself wincing at how “sociological” my own material sounds compared to anything else I was hearing. If I were attending a sociology conference, of course, I’d be feeling like a philosopher or an historian… Such is interdisciplinary life…

I was amused to find myself fielding the following questions over and over again at the conference:

First, when people learned we were presenting on Brandom (and assuming the reaction to this wasn’t “who?”), the question was: “Are you presenting on the big book?” Answer: yes, indeed, we read the big book - and, in fact, have also read the “little” book, which, for some currently unreconstructable reason, motivated us to tackle the big book… Unfortunately, I also read what appears to be the unknown book, at least to most folks attending this conference - but only after we had presented our paper (for some reason, this struck me as a logical form of leisure activity after the presentation - don’t ask…). In that book, I found what seems to be a relatively clear answer to some of the questions LM and I had been debating with one another before our presentation, debates which led to much last-minute revising on both our parts, in the hope of being a bit clearer about what we weren’t certain we yet understood. This whole experience suggests to me that, next time around, I should perhaps try to read, not only the “big” book, but indeed all the books, before scoping a presentation topic… ;-P

I should also note that L Magee seemed somewhat displeased by my efforts to reassure people that the “big” book perhaps wasn’t quite as difficult as it seems on first glance: some first impressions, apparently, are best left undeconstructed… ;-P

The second question we consistently received - more of a startled observation, really - came bursting out when people learned where we’re currently studying: “Really?! I didn’t know they had a philosophy department!” *shuffle shuffle* Yes, well… There might be a reason for that…

Onto other topics:

For those wanting something substantive to read, Nate has a question up at what in the hell…, which relates to how “my” Marx - the Marx I’m claiming becomes an immanent, reflexive critical theorist - maps onto more standard periodisations used in Marx scholarship: assuming that it’s plausible to think of Marx as an immanent reflexive critical theorist (which, I realise, some readers may find to require a bigger leap than others), is this interpretation something that can be plausibly applied to his entire corpus? If not, when did his work begin to express recognisably immanent reflexive characteristics? When did his work most completely express these characteristics? How would this map on to other ways of interpreting the periodisation of Marx’s corpus?

I’m very tired at the moment and, tiredness aside, I’m not sure my answer to this question is as “strong” as it perhaps should be. I’m comfortable reading the first volume of Capital as an immanent reflexive critique in the sense in which I use this term. I see some aspects of Capital as critical of some earlier positions Marx would have held - as a sort of self-diagnosis or self-critique, of what I think Marx comes to characterise as insufficiently historicised positions. So I see him as retaining a great deal from his earlier work, but only by transforming it into a much more historically specified perspective made available immanently within the context he is criticising.

I tend to see the Grundrisse as a major transition point, where Marx shifts to a more explicitly immanent perspective - but I’m not an expert on the evolution of Marx’s thought, and so this is an impressionistic position. There are moments in earlier works that are very consistent with what Marx does in Capital. There are also, just to keep things interesting, moments in Capital that aren’t consistent with what I’m claiming Marx is doing in Capital. I tend to read these moments as eddies in and around a main argumentative current - and to interpret them variously as vestiges of earlier positions (Marx often lifts passages from earlier works into Capital - sometimes, I think, being so fond of a formulation that he doesn’t fully reconsider how it might need to be worked to be adequate to its transplanted context), or incautious polemical statements, or conjunctural passages where Marx seems to have a very specific context in mind, without explicitly marking that context. Of course, it also doesn’t necessarily trouble me that there should be inconsistencies: I’m trying to explore what the work can suggest about a particular potential for theoretical work, rather than claiming perfection or completion in the realisation of this potential.

I haven’t done sufficient work to feel confident about what I think Marx does after publishing the first volume of Capital. I read the second and third volumes as compatible with the way I read volume one, although the incomplete nature of these works means that the sort of careful textual unfolding I’ve been doing with the first volume, wouldn’t be able to proceed in exactly the same way: the form of presentation is muddier, as are a number of substantive theoretical issues. Marx spends his final years doing intensive anthropological studies, and it would be extremely interesting to look into whether any of that reacts back on what he then thought would be required for an adequate critical theory - but this issue remains something that I’m curious about, but have never looked into directly.

Apologies for not being more coherent on this - it’s hitting me as I type how tired I am from the conference. Time, I think, for me to go play in Hobart, and let others say what they think about this question.